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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An examination of the European asylum system, with particular focus 
on voluntary and non-voluntary repatriation schemes. The 1951 UN 
Convention on Refugees prohibits the return of refugees and migrants 
to their countries where they have a “well founded fear of 
persecution”, this principle of non-refoulment has acted as a barrier 
to many states ability to return individuals to their home countries. 
Using qualitative research methodologies the author seeks to argue 
that since the late 2000s, European states have been complicit in 
forced repatriation through the removal of aid, harshening of asylum 
procedures and through distancing migrants from asylum processes . 
A case study on the United Kingdom Border Agency’s Assisted 
Voluntary Return Programme highlights member states ability to 
promote schemes that may not necessarily fit within the framework of 
the UNHCR voluntary return guidelines. It is also argued that 
temporary protection status is used by states as a pretext for the 
premature removal of individuals from EU territory. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Assisted Voluntary Return A method of return for migrants which is voluntary and is 
assisted financially and operationally by a government or 
organisation 
Convention Refugee An individual granted refugee status as they fit the description 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
ECtHR   European Court of Human Rights 
ECRE    European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
EEA    European Economic Area 
EU    European Union 
EU27    The 27 member states of the European Union 
gastarbeiter   Guest workers   
Geneva Convention The 1951 Convention on the Status Relating to Refugees and 
1961 Protocol 
Refugee Convention The 1951 Convention on the Status Relating to Refugees and 
1961 Protocol 
Repatriation Forced removal of a migrant from a host state 
Statutory Refugee An individual granted refugee status as they fit the description 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
Temporary Protection Status given by States in the event of a mass influx of displaced 
persons 
UKBA  United Kingdom Border Agency 
UN United Nations 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
Voluntary Return A method of return which is marketed as voluntary 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every year in excess of one million people are in receipt of refugee status in Europe. (UN 
Population Division, 2011). In 2010, migrants accounted for almost ten percent of Europe‟s 
population. (UN Population Division, 2011). The influx of migrants is arguably a drain on 
states resources and can result in efficacious right-wing xenophobia accelerating to the 
forefront of policy making agendas (Boswell, 2003). Research shows that the burden on less 
developed countries is disproportionately larger than that of the more developed nations 
(UNHCR, 2010). Despite this disparity of protection between the least and most 
economically advanced nations, since 2008 western European states have been devising 
programmes to assist voluntary repatriation to home countries for asylum seekers and 
refugees.  
Whilst one million refugees may seem like a staggering amount, it pales into insignificance 
when compared to the ten million refugees and forty million displaced people in the world 
today (UNHCR, 2010).  It is fair to argue that the EU has not been forthcoming in its 
protection of individuals fleeing conflict and persecution. By all accounts the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1961 Protocol (Refugee Convention, 1951 
Convention, Geneva Convention hereafter) is limiting in its definition
1
 of a refugee
2
. 
Already, by 1969, the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU), had established its own 
                                                        
1 The text of the Refugee Convention defines a refugee as “owing to  well-founded  fear  of  being  
persecuted  for  reasons  of  race,  religion,  nationality,  membership  of  a  particular  social  
group  or  political  opinion,  is  outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,  owing to 
such fear, is unwilling  to  avail  himself  of  the  protection  of  that  country ;  or  who,  not  
having  a nationality  and  being  outside  the  country  of  his  former  habitual  residence as  a  
result  of  such  events,  is  unable  or,  owing  to  such  fear,  is  unwilling  to return  to  it.” (UN 
General Assembly, 1951, Art. 1). Leading Refugee Lawyer and scholar Goodwinn-Gill describes 
refugees as “include[ing] not only those who can, on a case-by-case basis, be determined to have 
a well founded fear of persecution on certain grounds (the so called “statutory refugees‟); but 
also other often large groups of persons who can be determined or presumed to be without, or 
unable to avail themselves of, the protection of the government of their state of origin (now 
often referred as “displaced persons‟ or “persons of concern‟). In each case, it is essential that 
the persons in question should have crossed an international frontier and that in the case of the 
latter group, the reason for flight should be traceable to conflicts, or radical political, social or 
economic changes in their country” (Goodwin-Gill, 1996, p. 29). 
2 The legal definition of a refugee within international law has remained the same since 1961. 
The Geneva Convention and its Protocol do not include factors such as environmental and 
natural disasters, famine, internal conflict and financial insecurity as factors contributing 
towards the displacement of people from their homes and countries. For further information on 
the inadequacy of the international definition of a refugee in modern times see, Fitpatrick’s 
(1996) Revitalising the 1951 Refugee Convention and Foster’s (2002) Causation In Context: 
Interpreting The Nexus Clause In The Refugee Convention. 
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regional Refugee Convention to widen the scope of the refugee definition (Cooley and Rutter, 
2007). The international community is still awaiting one of the most economically stable 
regional organisations to follow suit and establish its own wider definition of a refugee. 
Instead of refugee status, individuals seeking protection in Europe who do not conform to the 
traditional Statutory Refugee description are granted time-limited temporary protection 
(Cooley and Rutter, 2007). 
There can be no doubt that violent conflicts continue unabated, whilst the number of violent 
conflicts worldwide has dropped in a post-Cold War context, the number still remains high in 
comparison to the post Second World War period (Cooley and Rutter, 2007). In spite of the 
continuing number of violent conflicts, worldwide asylum applications to the EU have 
decreased since 2003. This paper seeks to examine how the EU has received fewer asylum 
claims despite maintained instability, through the use of legislative mechanisms to separate 
individuals from asylum systems.   
International law enshrines the right of individuals to flee their countries and seek asylum in a 
safe country
3
 (UDHR, 1948, Art. 14). The provision of asylum to individuals fleeing 
persecution and conflict is derived from western tradition. Medieval times saw asylum taking 
the form of protecting those who sought sanctuary in a church or other religious building. 
Today, processes have been formulated to streamline the claim for asylum by individuals. 
Noll argues that asylum theory can be underpinned by an axiomatic dialectic of which there 
are two schools of thought: universalism and particularism. Universalism favours the 
obligation of the global community to protect individuals excluded from the protection of 
their nation state: “the existential interest of the individual [is] prior to that of a potential host 
community” (Noll, 2000, p.75). Immanuel Kant agrees, stating that “cosmopolitan law shall 
be restricted to condition of hospitality
4” (Kant, 1795 cited by Noll, 2000, p.76).  
Particularism, conversely, promotes the right of states to remain sovereign, arguing that a 
claim for asylum is a claim for resources and thus states have right to assess and reject these 
claims. The spatial constraints of this paper do not allow for a deep evaluation of protection 
                                                        
3 Whilst the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does not contain an 
explicit reference to the right to seek and enjoy asylum as with other international legal instruments, 
scholars contend that the all encompassing characteristic of the ECHR and indeed, given the greater 
enforceability of the ECHR due to its Court some have argued that the ECHR has become as equally 
effective as the Geneva Convention in the protection of asylum seekers in Europe. (Mole, 2009). 
4
 “Das Weltbürgerrecht soll auf Bedinungen der allgemeinen Hospitalität eingeschränk sein” [Original 
in German] 
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theories
5
; however this dissertation highlights the preference of European states to a 
particularism approach to protection.  
The 1951 UN Convention on the Status Relating to Refugees maintains that the safe return of 
a migrant to his or her home country is the primary aim of both host and home nations (UN 
General Assembly, 1951). The convention is the product of efforts from many of the EU27 to 
provide international recognition and protection of those most in need. This can be attributed 
to the monstrous violations of human rights committed during the Hitler era (Guild, 2006). 
Indeed the refugee agency of the UN, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
places great emphasis on the safe return of migrants to their home countries (UNHCR, 2011). 
The UNHCR handbook on voluntary return of migrants outlines the conditions
6
 necessary for 
legitimate “voluntary return‟ (UNHCR, 1996); literature suggests that the UK Border Agency 
(UKBA) Assisted Voluntary Return programmes fall short of these criteria. 
Numerous scholars agree that the principle aim of host nations as regards refugees is to safely 
return the refugee to their country of origin when it is feasible. The principle of non-
refoulment (UN General Assembly, 1951, art. 33) is intended to prohibit states from returning 
refugees to a country where they have a “well founded fear of persecution”, there is great 
dispute as to how this well-founded fear can be manifested and is a subjective problem that 
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. It is for this reason that this paper does not seek to 
argue whether the UN Convention provides enough protection for refugees. Instead it seeks 
to ascertain whether European states are complicit in forced repatriation.  
With the central aim of successful refugee protection being the return of refugees to their 
home countries and a growing fear from the right of foreigners, Europe has turned to 
voluntary schemes to assist refugees to return to their native countries. The principle of non-
refoulment not only prohibits the unsafe return of a refugee, but also places a duty on the host 
nation to properly ensure that the conditions for return are met before encouraging a refugee 
to return home.  
European voluntary return schemes have advanced to the front of the global stage since 2010, 
when French President Nicholas Sarkosy was criticised for his controversial “voluntary‟ 
                                                        
5
 For further information on asylum theories see Noll‟s (2000) Negotiating Asylum. 
6
 For further information on conditions established for voluntary return by the UNHCR see the 
Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection (1996). 
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scheme to remove large numbers of Roma citizens from France
7
(Webber, 2010: Hannan, 
2010). As EU citizens the Roma are entitled to freedom of movement and habitation in any of 
the EU Member States and the EU justice commissioner compared the bulldozing of over one 
hundred Roma encampments to Nazi deportations. Whilst the French case was controversial 
in itself, it also raised serious questions about the legitimacy of other European schemes.   
Voluntary return schemes have been utilised within Europe since the 1970s in a bid to rid 
Europe from gastarbeiter, who helped to rebuild Europe after the devastation of World War 
Two.  
The Dutch government introduced a scheme in 1974 to 
„reintegrate‟ guest workers from Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco in 
their home countries, and similar schemes were introduced in 
France in 1977 and in Germany in 1983. (Webber, 2010).  
Despite the apparent good intentions of European governments to „reintegrate‟ migrants in 
their home countries, there was little success and many of the schemes were discontinued. 
European voluntary return schemes returned in 2008, the Spanish government reintroduced a 
voluntary return scheme in a bid to encourage Latin American migrant workers to return 
home.  
For the purposes of this paper the term migrant will be used to describe individuals who 
arrive into the EU from a third party state. Europe is referred to throughout this dissertation to 
signify the European Union. Occasionally this paper makes reference to the EU‟s neutral 
partners: Norway and Switzerland. Both these states are members of the European Economic 
Area (EEA). For clarity the use of the terms Europe and the EU throughout this paper refer 
explicitly to the regional body of the 27 member states of the EU. 
                                                        
7
 “Following a spate of violence in July involving French police and some Roma and traveler 
individuals, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced a crackdown on unauthorized settlements... 
French police dismantled numerous settlements, primarily occupied by Roma from Bulgaria and 
Romania, and the French government expelled more than 1,000 of their inhabitants between July and 
September, sending them back to their home countries...Sarkozy also characterized the deportations as 
voluntary, because a significant number of the Roma Bulgarian and Romanian citizens were given 
300 euros..in exchange for their cooperation in the return process...[The European Commission] 
called France's actions toward the Roma and their settlements discriminatory and threatened punitive 
action against France for breaching EU antidiscrimination law, as well as failing to ensure the right to 
freedom of movement for EU citizens.” (Severance, 2010, para. 15). 
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This dissertation seeks to argue that member states of the European Union do not place 
individuals at the centre of their asylum policies. It will be argued that asylum seekers and 
refugees are viewed as burdensome entities for European governments and that policies are 
designed towards removing migrants from EU territory and distancing individuals from 
asylum processes and settled life in the EU. Evidence within this paper shows that EU law 
punishes states for allowing asylum seekers onto EU territory by giving the state sole 
responsibility for determining their claim. Moreover, it is demonstrated that governments 
continue to forcibly remove migrants to countries where it has been deemed unsafe for 
individuals to return. It is also argued the lack of monitoring of returnees to their countries of 
origin by the host states promotes a worrying setting for the return of migrants. This paper 
makes frequent references to the UNHCR‟s position on return but for reasons of space and 
because this text is specifically about European return, those references are brief and thus 
perforce incomplete. 
Primarily utilising secondary sources, this project seeks to be a piece of investigative research 
highlighting the deficiencies of the European asylum system. Due to the time constraints of 
this paper the research method adopts a deductive approach; that the European system is 
complicit in forced repatriation. For the purposes of this paper the use of primary research is 
not appropriate for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the ethics involving the interviewing of 
participants in return schemes are highly contentious. It may be inappropriate for individuals 
to be requested to give their opinions of policy when they are faced with return to their 
country of origin. Furthermore it may problematic for one to gain access to these individuals, 
based on the fact that they are within a process and are shortly due to leave the country. 
Thirdly, the time and spatial constraints of this dissertation do not allow for the in-depth 
interviewing required to justify primary research in the first instance. It may be appropriate 
for a less constrained paper to interview participants; however this piece would provide an 
incomplete analysis of the data and therefore potentially cause unnecessary emotional harm 
to participants without enhancing the quality of this paper.  
The sources consulted for this paper reflect journalistic, academic, community, non-
governmental and governmental views in an attempt to remain panoptic. A number of 
primary sources have been utilised in the form of opinions from UKBA representatives. It is 
of course necessary to highlight the potential for a number of these sources to be biased in 
favour of the authors‟ opinion. Governmental sources have been utilised stringently, as well 
10 
 
as sources deriving from non-governmental organisations. Academic books and journal 
articles are favoured, because they are widely reviewed by other experts in the field and are 
often less subjective than journalistic, non-governmental and governmental data.  
This dissertation will take a country and thematic specific focus. The second chapter will 
offer as the country specific focus of return in the form of a case study of the UK‟s voluntary 
and forced removal mechanisms. Chapter two will outline the UK‟s policy of assisted 
voluntary return as the EU‟s preferred means of migrant removal. This chapter will assess the 
merits and the criticisms of the voluntary schemes, such as the extent to which voluntary 
schemes are truly voluntary and dignified, as well as evaluate the means of forced removal 
utilised by the UK.  
Acting as the thematic focus, the third chapter deals with the contentious problem of 
temporary protection within Europe; an issue that has evolved in legality and practicability 
significantly in the last two decades. This chapter will briefly examine how temporary 
protection can conflict with the Geneva Convention, and in addition to this, it will seek to 
examine how the granting of rights or lack thereof plays a significant role in encouraging 
individuals to return to their countries of origin. This chapter will also evaluate how 
temporary protection as a specific tool has been utilised to distance individuals and groups 
from traditional asylum procedures and therefore lead to premature repatriation of displaced 
persons.  
Nevertheless in order to effectively analyse these issues within Europe, it is first necessary to 
provide a theoretical and contextual framework within which these issues can be expanded. 
Therefore the purpose of the first chapter is to give a brief history of asylum policy in the 
European Union, moving from the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 to the notorious Returns 
Directive of 1998. The first chapter will also provide a theoretical framework of returns and 
look at burden sharing in Europe, as well as examining wider returns policies within Europe 
of voluntary and forced return. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
European Politics of Repatriation and Return  
It is fair to state that European asylum policy has had a difficult beginning. Claims for asylum 
hit an all time high during the early 2000‟s (Pearce, 2011) and as will be illustrated 
throughout the course of this dissertation, European States have adopted varying strategies to 
cope with large scale migration. As previously described, the primary objective for the 
UNHCR is the safe return of migrants to their countries of origin; a welcome opportunity for 
European states to initiate return schemes.  
This first chapter is charged with giving a detailed yet succinct history of asylum policy in the 
EU. It will analyse some of the shortcomings of the EU aquis in an attempt to provide a 
background to the later chapters of this dissertation. It will be argued that EU asylum policy 
does not place the individual at the centre of the asylum seeking process, that instead policies 
focus on distancing individuals from asylum processes and on their swift removal. The 
beginnings of EU law and how this has affected asylum policy will be analysed. Auditing the 
many documents amending the functions of the EU this chapter will highlight how these 
amendments restricted migrants from accessing EU territory and asylum systems. It will also 
briefly examine the concept of burden-sharing in Europe, in particular the establishment of a 
European Return Fund. Finally this chapter will give a brief account of the two returns 
methods utilised by the EU: voluntary and forced return. Nevertheless, in order for this paper 
to accurately analyse returns policy in Europe, it is first necessary to explore the theoretical 
framework of repatriation. 
Theories of Repatriation 
There exists great debate on the value of return as a solution to migration problems. Many 
scholars concur that the return of migrants is paramount to the reestablishment of a “natural 
order” (Malkki, 1992). It is thought that the long-term displacement of people from their 
countries is not only unfortunate and burdensome but that it is also perverse (Black and Gent, 
2006). Hammond goes so far as to state that there is an assumption that the return of migrants 
is intrinsic to allowing individuals and communities their moral, cultural, economic and 
spiritual growth (Hammond, 1999). The World Bank is a conformer of this view, stating that 
“there can be no hope of normalcy until the majority of those displaced are able to reintegrate 
12 
 
themselves into their societies” (UNHCR, 1997, p. 9). Despite this, Hammond also draws 
attention to the dangers of attaching individuals to locations and defining them as belonging 
in a particular country (Hammond, 1999).  The experience of returning „home‟8 can often be 
as traumatic if not more so than exile from one‟s „home‟. The Sorensen concurs that “for the 
refugees who had received assistance in exile...the return could be more difficult than the 
experience of exile itself.” (Sorensen, 1996 cited by UNHCR, 1997, p. 6).  
Rosand (1998, cited by Black and Gent, 2006) contends that the right to leave and return to a 
country of origin for individuals is founded on natural law. The Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights (UDHR) states in article 13 that “everyone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country” (UN General Assembly, 1948, Art. 13). 
Despite the clear universalist assertion of an individual‟s right to flee their home country, in 
practice, governments are afforded a particularistic degree of sovereignty in deciding which 
cases warrant protection in the form of refugee status, temporary protection status or 
humanitarian protection in a host country (Black and Gent, 2006). There can be no doubt that 
the premature return of individuals to their countries of origin infringes upon their right to 
seek asylum, as well as potentially harming their right to life, freedom from torture and 
discrimination to name a few. It is therefore clear that return theories are highly controversial 
and this paper does not wish to dwell on contentious theory, favouring instead an a posteriori 
view of returns from Europe. This chapter will hereon focus on how European states as a 
collective and individuals create immigration policy. 
European Asylum Policy 
The European Union officially holds two functions; the establishment of a Common Market 
and an Economic and Monetary Union (Guild, 2006). In order to function effectively it is 
presupposed that states will relinquish aspects of sovereignty and cooperate within a regional 
union. As a result of this multilateral weakening of state sovereignty, subsequent and more 
recent development in European Union (EU) law have placed greater emphasis on human 
rights. Indeed, the Treaty of Maastricht of 1991 which established the EU referred to the 
principles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as created by the Council 
                                                        
8
 The notion of „home‟ is highly contested among epistomic communities. Scholars adduce that 
„home‟ constitutes the region from which a migrant hailed. Conversely, others find that refugees and 
asylum seekers may find themselves more at „home‟ in their country of refuge in comparison with 
their country of origin (Black and Gent, 2006). This particular viewpoint is especially pertinent when 
considering the length of time those seeking asylum may be required to wait before receiving a 
decision on their asylum claim – a theme which is further discussed in chapters two and three. 
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of Europe in 1953 (European Union, 1953, Article 6). The respect and promotion of human 
rights thus became an additional function of the EU.  
Initially refugees, asylum seekers and their rights were not at the crux of EU policy making; 
quite deliberately so. Guild describes the omission of asylum policy from early EU acquis 
communitaire, stating that “they are the objects of increasing efforts to render them invisible 
in practice by ensuring they are not physically present” (Guild, 2006, p. 633). Indeed, it could 
be argued that the antipathy for migrants within Europe is characterised in current EU 
legislation. Third country
9
 nationals lawfully residing within a member state for five years are 
afforded the right to freedom of movement within the EU. Such luxuries have not been 
provided to refugees, despite the commissions promises to do so (Guild, 2006).  
There can be no doubt that the EU‟s functions require a weakening of territoriality of its 
member states. A Common Market and the Single European Act call for the abolition of 
border controls at intra member state borders. The freedom of movement of people and goods 
are the foundation of these two legislative documents: “The internal market shall comprise an 
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.” (European Union, 1986, 
Article 13). Therefore, shared borders between member states were weakened and great 
efforts were taken to coordinate manufacturing standards across the region to allow a free 
flow of goods and people within the EU (Guild, 2006). As regards refugees and asylum 
seekers, the EU could rely on the Geneva Convention to harmonise the minimal standards of 
European Asylum Policy (UN General Assembly, 1951). 
It was not until the ratification of both the Schengen Implementing Agreement (Schengen 
Agreement) in 1990 and the Dublin Convention that irregular migrants such as refugees and 
asylum seekers were expressly referred to in EU law. The two treaties defined intra member 
state borders in order to determine which member state held responsibility for the individual 
and their asylum claim (Guild, 2006). Upon its ratification in 1997 the Dublin Convention 
superseded the asylum portion of the Schengen Agreement. Nevertheless Guild argues that 
both treaties give three principles for asylum policy. Firstly, that member states may share 
their responsibilities in the rejection of asylum claims. Secondly, member states have the 
sovereignty to decide the refugee status of applicants within their own territory. Thirdly, that 
this sovereignty and responsibility is “treated in both treaties as a burden and a punishment 
                                                        
9
 A third country refers to a nation outside of the EU. 
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for the member state which permitted the individual to arrive in the Union”10 (Guild, 2006, p. 
637).  
It is clear that the weakening of border controls within the EU in order to support the 
treasured main functions of the EU does not exist in the case of asylum. Noll argues that the 
EU states have used a particularistic interpretation of the Geneva Convention to deflect the 
arrival of asylum seekers from EU territories (Noll, 2003). The interpretation provides that 
the Geneva Convention only prohibits the return of a migrant to the country of origin, not 
another safe country. Thus the community places the responsibility on the asylum seeker to 
claim asylum in the first country they arrive in, not their chosen host state. The EU regard the 
arrival of an asylum seeker from another safe third country as “manifestly unfounded” 
(Guild, 2000, p.58) that by travelling through a safe third country the individual did not 
require the protection of the European community but could be returned to the first safe 
country in which he or she landed.  In these instances the community found that there 
required no substantive determination of the individual‟s asylum case (Noll, 2003). In 
simplistic terms, EU residents and nationals may travel within the EU without undue 
paperwork or delay; those within the asylum system may not. In theory explosives and arms 
manufactured within the EU may travel freely around the member states; third country 
nationals fleeing conflict and persecution may not seek asylum in the state of their choice. 
The exclusion of migrants from the freedom of movement within the EU and the burdening 
of states to discourage the permitting of aliens into EU territory continued within the text of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 (Guild, 2006). The EU continued its integration in a 
manner of territorial exceptionalism. Nevertheless integration and the Common Market 
suffered as a result of the internal border controls designed to distance asylum seekers from 
other member states. At this point the “exception of refugees would have to be dealt with” 
(Guild, 2006, p. 641) 
It became clear that there were two options for the European community as regards the 
abolition of border controls at the internal frontiers. First, and by all accounts the preferred 
route according to NGOs and activists, to dissolute the Dublin Convention‟s exclusionist 
                                                        
10
 Article 30 of the Schengen Agreement states that “The Contracting Party which granted an alien the 
status of refugee and right of residence shall be obliged to take responsibility for processing any 
application for asylum made by a member of the alien's family provided that the persons concerned 
agree.” (European Union, 1985, p.8). Thus forcing member states which have allowed individuals into 
the EU territory to also handle any further claims from family members of that individual. 
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principles allowing those within national asylum systems to travel within the EU. Second the 
EU must “reconcile the removal of asylum seekers from the territory of the EU very rapidly 
before their presence could disturb the internal market” (Guild, 2006, p.641). The second 
option prevailed and the Treaty of Amsterdam called for the EU to develop measures to 
forcibly remove illegal migrants within five years (European Union, 1997, Art. 63.3). It is no 
surprise that extraterritorial processing
11
 soon became a preferred policy route for asylum 
claims. Having examined the developments in asylum policy in the EU during the past two 
decades, this chapter will continue to examine how The Hague Programme of 2004 is 
influential in determining current European asylum policies. Nevertheless the issues of return 
and temporary protection will be revisited below and in chapters two and three.  
The Hague Programme  
November 2004 saw the second
12
 programme of action in freedom, security and justice 
published by the EU. The establishment of the Hague Programme was met with criticism 
from civil body organisations and the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2004). In its recommendations to 
the community the UNHCR “strongly encourage[d] the European Council to reaffirm its 
commitment to develop future asylum and migration policy based on the full and inclusive 
application of the 1951 Convention and other relevant human rights instruments” (UNHCR, 
2004, p.1). It is clear from the language of the recommendations that the UNHCR was 
concerned about the risk that the Hague Programme could induce breaches of international 
law. Indeed, the UNHCR called upon the community to amend particularistic policies to 
provide stronger minimum standards set out in EU law to “reflect higher standards in line 
with international law and best practice” (UNHCR, 2004, p.1).  
                                                        
11
 “It was intended for [Transit Processing Centres]TPCs to be located in countries close to the 
external borders of the European Union (EU). Asylum seekers arriving in the UK, or any other EU 
country, would be sent to these processing centres and detained while their claim was decided. It was 
also possible that asylum seekers intercepted en route would be sent to the centres. Successful 
applicants would be resettled within the EU on a „burden-sharing basis‟. Unsuccessful claimants 
would be either returned to their country of origin or given temporary protection until repatriation was 
possible”. (ICAR, 2004, p. 5). 
12
 The first programme of action in freedom, security and justice was established in Tampere in 1999, 
where member “states set themselves the goal of establishing a common EU policy on immigration 
and asylum. Member states began by setting out to establish minimum standards to which all 
countries must conform in order to reduce the disparity between the different countries‟ policies” 
(Refugee Council, 2011, para. 2). Parties to the document would accept the judgements of other 
parties without question, meaning that member states could not challenge decisions taken by other 
member states in the area of asylum policy (Guild, 2006).  
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The UN Refugee Agency also expressed concern over the exclusionist nature of aquis 
communitaire, that individuals seeking asylum must not be prevented from accessing EU 
territory and asylum procedures, as is the case with extraterritorial processing. The UNHCR 
also advises a re-examination of the „safe third country‟ concept, that member states should 
not place individuals arriving through safe third countries at a disadvantage in their claim for 
asylum (UNHCR, 2004). Furthermore, the seventeenth recommendation encourages the 
community to assist with the capacity building of neighbouring states in the processing and 
reception of asylum seekers, “it further calls on the EU and Member States to support 
neighbours in providing access to durable solutions, including through resettlement in the 
EU” (UNHCR, 2004, p.3). 
A further contention of the Hague Programme is the proposal of a concept of „safe countries 
of origin‟. The community proposed to compile a list of countries which were deemed safe 
enough for asylum claims from these nations to be rejected without substantive determination 
of the individuals‟ case and the individual returned to that country (Statewatch, 2004). The 
countries on this list included Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Ghana, Mali, 
Mauritius, Senegal and Uruguay (Statewatch, 2004). The UNHCR urged caution over this 
proposal stating that “due to insufficient safeguards or vague terminology, these could lead to 
asylum-seekers being summarily sent back to non-EU countries without any guarantee that 
their asylum claim will be properly dealt with there.”(UNHCR, 2003, para 4). Fortunately, 
this proposal has not been implemented due to disagreement between member states over the 
true „safety‟ of the named countries.  
Directives issued by the European community focus heavily on the concept of burden-sharing 
between member states. In order for the EU to successfully continue its main functions it is 
necessary for states to share their responsibilities and resources as regards the reception and 
return of migrants. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam clearly states that member states have a 
responsibility to promote “a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and 
bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons” (European Union, 
1997). Noll claims that there are three methods of burden-sharing, the first is policy sharing, 
the second is physical burden-sharing of people and third is resource sharing: the sharing of 
finance (Noll, 1997). Thielemann argues that fiscal burden-sharing has been “the 
institutionally most advanced burden-sharing initiative in this area” (Thielemann, 2005, 
p.815).  
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The European Return Fund (ERF) originated in the Council meeting of justice and home 
affairs ministers in 1999, which sought to afford temporary protection for a potential mass 
influx of asylum-seekers. The ERF has been hailed to be “the first step towards a common 
asylum system” (European Commission, 2004, cited by, Thielemann, 2005, p.816). Scholars 
have contended that the European Refugee Fund is purely a figurative aspect of European 
politics (Thielemann, 2005), the fund has allocated EU resources proportionately to the 
burden on each member state according to the number of irregular migrants it receives 
(Thielemann, 2005). The fact that the EU‟s primary concern is the protection of resources not 
individual‟s rights to seek asylum is salient. This chapter will assess return as a concept to rid 
Europe of its burdening protection responsibilities, it will act as a useful overview of wider 
return policies in Europe, dealing with the issues that will be addressed in chapters two and 
three. 
Voluntary Assisted Return in Europe 
Assisted voluntary return (AVR) is the removal of migrants on a voluntary basis, usually 
facilitated by the offering of payment in cash or kind and the provision of services in the 
country of origin. The Chr. Michelsen Institute argues that “Voluntary assisted return is by 
far the preferred option. It is much less costly than forced returns – only around a quarter of 
the expense – and is more dignified and politically acceptable. The early 2000s saw 
Europeans move towards voluntary return programmes, inspired by political or social change 
in the countries of origin. The return of Bosnians to their country prompted European 
governments to extend these programmes to other migrants, specifically failed asylum 
seekers. The extension of such programmes is problematic on a number of levels, not least 
because the very voluntariness of the programmes is called into question. Furthermore, 
governments may be complicit in using voluntary return as a means to aid the redevelopment 
of a society shattered by conflict despite the issues that this creates, as outlined in the study of 
return theories at the beginning of this chapter and in chapter two (Black and Gent, 2006).  
Despite these concerns, there can be no doubt that the return of refugees and migrants to their 
home countries has significantly augmented, assisted voluntary return has increased “five-
fold in ten years from four [country programmes] to more than twenty” (Black and Gent, 
2006, p.17). The reasons behind this growth is explained below. Indeed the only European 
state not to offer an assisted voluntary programme is Estonia; the EU‟s closely associated 
albeit neutral neighbours Norway and Switzerland also offer assisted return packages in 
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common with the EU. Nevertheless, Assisted Voluntary Return is fiercely controversial in 
that its voluntariness is disputed: “in some cases, „voluntary‟ can be taken simply to mean an 
absence of force in removal, but the refugee is effectively given no choice at all.” (Black and 
Gent, 2006, p. 19). The spatial constraints of this paper do not allow for a detailed analysis of 
the many Assisted Voluntary Return programmes in the EU, instead chapter two will evaluate 
the voluntariness and problems of a case study voluntary return programme initiated by the 
UK.  
Forced Return in Europe  
In 2008, the European Community set out the rules for the repatriation of migrants; the 
Returns Directive. This directive had a difficult birth with proposals moving to and from the 
legislative and administrative powers of the EU: the Parliament and the Council. The 
directive focuses heavily on the voluntary return of illegally staying third-country nationals. 
It was recognised that, should individuals not return home voluntarily, a set of minimum 
standards needed to be established for the forced removal of these individuals (European 
Union, 2008).  
Article seven of the Returns Directive states that return decisions must allow for a period 
where the individual may return voluntarily (European Union, 2008). The pressure on 
member states to voluntarily return migrants from the EU and the wider UN acted as a 
catalyst for member states to reintroduce voluntary return programmes. Article eight stresses 
the legality of the use of force in the returns processes where proportionate and appropriate 
(European Union, 2008). Nevertheless, despite the criteria that the directive sets out for a 
dignified return, critics argue that the eighteen month limit on detention of returnees as set 
out in the directive is “unjustifiable” (Statewatch, 2008, p. 5) and that many of the provisions 
“would potentially violate human rights standards” (Statewatch, 2008, p. 5).  
Furthermore, by far the greatest contention of the Returns Directive is that it is empty 
rhetoric, not a genuine commitment to dignity, fairness and human rights. This viewpoint is 
justified when taking into account the fact that not all member states have opted into the 
directive. The document outlines some minimal standards for the fulfilment of basic human 
rights in removal; the fact that some states have not opted-in to these basic rules sets a 
worrying scene for removals from the EU. The UK and Ireland are the principle culprits of 
this non-compliance (European Parliament, 2008). The UK bases its argument that the Return 
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Directive does not deliver the strong returns regime required for the EU. It argues “that the 
Directive makes returning illegally staying third country nationals actually more difficult and 
more bureaucratic” (European Parliament, 2008, para.12). The returns policies of the UK 
without the restrictions of EU law will therefore be evaluated in the second chapter. 
Conclusion  
There is a clear theme throughout these developments in EU aquis that “solidarity among 
sovereign states is privileged over the reality of rights protection of the individual” (Guild, 
2006, p. 643). This chapter has demonstrated that the EU has made some dramatic 
improvements in its law on asylum in the last three decades moving from exclusionist dogma 
in the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and the Dublin Convention to specific documents 
outlining minimum standards for the treatment of migrants in removals in the form of the 
Returns Directive. Despite these improvements it is salient that universalism is not the 
preferred approach and that the community relies on individual states to ratify, opt-in and 
implement these provisions. Therefore “the failure of any state to act in accordance...becomes 
an act of challenge in itself against the trust and confidence that is the objective of the 
exercise” (Guild, 2006, p. 643). It may be fair to observe that, if states do not implement and 
agree to the principles of particularistic EU law, then the documents themselves are rendered 
palliative at best.  
It has been found that voluntary return is by far the preferred method of migrant removal. It is 
the least politically sensitive, costly and undignified means for a country to remove its 
„burdensome‟ migrant population. This chapter has examined in detail the emerging of a 
Common Asylum Policy, from the creation of the EU to the creation of a unified Return 
Fund. It has aided in giving a concise background to the issues and obstacles faced in asylum 
policy in the EU. Chapter two will focus on return issues on a country specific basis.  
 
 
  
20 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
A British Example 
In 2002 the UK abolished “Exceptional Leave to Remain” status for those who did not fit the 
criteria established by the 1951 Convention, but who could not be returned to their conflict-
rife home countries. (Blitz, Sales & Marzano, 2005). This has coincided with harsher asylum 
procedures as well as a strengthening of the “temporary” nature of protection (Sales, 2002), 
an issue which will be further developed in the third chapter. It would seem that the British 
government is restricting its protective activities and seeking to rid their territory of burden-
heavy immigrants: “Returns are portrayed as a means of relieving the burden on welfare 
services, and placating an increasingly anti-immigrant public opinion” (Blitz, Sales & 
Marzano, 2005, p.182).  
Taking a focused view, this chapter seeks to examine, in detail, voluntary removal schemes 
as the most “dignified” policy of removal. This chapter will look at voluntary schemes as a 
purposed durable and dignified means of migrant removal. The UK provides a suitable 
candidate for a case study, as it receives a relatively small number of asylum applications and 
returns a high number of individuals. This chapter seeks to evaluate the merits of the UKBA 
Assisted Voluntary Return Programmes and to what extent these programmes are truly 
voluntary and indeed, humane and dignified, placing the individual at the centre of the return 
in a universalist manner. Firstly, it is necessary to highlight staggering number of forced 
returns instigated by the UK and in what way forced return differs to voluntary return.  
Forced Repatriation from the UK 
Between January and December 2010 the UKBA forcibly repatriated the largest number of 
migrants to their countries of origin in the EU; over 15,000 migrants (MRF Brussels, 2010). 
The nearest challenger to this title was the Netherlands with just 4,000 forced repatriations 
(MRF Brussels, 2010). These figures demonstrate that the overwhelming majority
13
 of 
migrants leaving the UK in 2010 were forcibly removed. One may question how an affluent 
country with relatively minor asylum concerns is permitted to forcibly remove large 
quantities of people from its boarders? Furthermore what is the motivation behind these 
                                                        
13
 As compared to the 4549 individuals who left the UK under the assisted voluntary return 
programmes (MRF Brussels, 2010). 
21 
 
costly
14
 forced removals of migrants? It may be fair to explain the large proportion of these 
forced repatriations as the eventual return of failed asylum seekers who have refused to utilise 
assisted return schemes. Nevertheless this remains an extra-ordinarily large figure compared 
to its European neighbours. UKBA representatives explain these figures by stating that other 
European states do not include border controlled refusals or entry in their figures and that the 
UK is transparent in its documentation of removals compared to other EU states
15
. 
It is interesting to note that whilst the UK has forcibly removed huge numbers of migrants, it 
has a significantly lower number of asylum applications per year compared its affluent 
European neighbours (MRF Brussels, 2010). Indeed the number of asylum applications 
rejected by the UK is not proportionate when compared to other European counterparts. For 
example in 2010 the UK received 13,160 asylum claims, it rejected 90.3 percent of these 
claims (MRF Brussels, 2010). Germany
16
 by comparison received 44,857 asylum claims and 
rejected 61 percent of its asylum claims (MRF Brussels, 2010). In short, the UK receives a 
small proportion of asylum claims in the EU; it rejects the vast majority of these claims and is 
responsible for 46 percent of forced returns for the whole 27 member state EU (MRF 
Brussels, 2010). 
In order for an individual or family
17
 to be forcibly removed from the UK there is a multi-
step process. Upon receiving the decision denying the individual leave to remain in the UK, 
the individual is given the right to appeal to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (UKBA, 
n.d.a, Arts. 395A-F). The steps to departure are three-fold. Firstly, the individual receives a 
decision. Secondly, if their subsequent appeals are rejected, individuals are offered assisted 
return. Finally, if this offer is rejected by the applicant, the UKBA will issue a required return 
                                                        
14
 The enforced removal of an individual from the UK can cost between £4,000 and £30,000. Figures 
offered by a UKBA representative at an NGO training day (22
nd
 July, 2011). 
15
 Statement offered by a UKBA representative at an NGO training day regarding forced removal of 
families and children from the UK (22
nd
 July, 2011). 
16
 Germany is used as a comparative as it had the largest number of asylum claims in the EU during 
2010 (MRF Brussels, 2010). Germany also serves as a suitable comparative country due to its similar 
political and economic situation (BBC, 2011).  
17
 The returns process varies slightly for families. Families are offered “self check-in” returns where 
they are provided with a ticket to their country of origin and are required to leave the UK at that time. 
However, if a family fails to leave through self check-in, they will be arrested at  their home and 
brought to a „pre-departure accommodation‟ centre, where they will await the next available flight 
home. Families will not be able to stay in the accommodation for more than 72 hours in order to 
comply with the coalition government‟s promises to end child detention for immigration purposes 
(Watt, 2011: UKBA, 2011).  In a controversial move children‟s charity Barnardo‟s have been funded 
to provide social and welfare services to families and children during their stay at the pre-departure 
accommodation (Watt, 2011).   
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notice, informing the applicant that they will be removed within 72 hours (UKBA, n.d.a, 
Arts. 395A-F). All too often ensured return is utilised and migrants are located by 
immigration teams and immediately sent to a detention centre, where the migrant will await 
departure on the next available flight, subject to the individual holding the relevant travel 
documents (Mind, 2009a). Individuals may be detained for longer than 72 hours before they 
are issued an ensured return notice (UKBA, n.d.a, Arts. 395A-F).  
One cannot undermine the effect that detention can have on an individual‟s mental health. As 
a vital part of the immigration and removal process, individuals and to a lesser extent families 
may be detained in removal centres and immigration detention centres for long periods of 
time. “At any one time around 3,000 people…are held in the 11 removal centres across the 
UK…Currently, there is no time limit on detention in the UK and some people have been 
held for years at a time without knowing when they might be released.” (Mind, 2009a, p. 7). 
It is clear that the unnecessarily excessive periods held in detention can seriously impact on 
an individual‟s mental health18, and that detention should be used as a last resort, not a stop 
gap between receiving a decision and being removed. 
Furthermore research also highlights that the UKBA have made the access to legal aid for 
asylum claims more stringent: “earlier all asylum cases were entitled to legal aid, but now, 
only 5% of the cases are granted. The conduct of an asylum case is impossible without at 
least £5,000” (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2005, p. 21) and “the interpretation 
service relating to asylum determination is hopeless. In many circumstances, interpreters 
translate the statements of asylum seekers incorrectly, leading to the rejection of the 
application or appeal” (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2005, p. 22). It is therefore 
clear that the UKBA has not facilitated asylum seekers in obtaining refugee status, by 
removing legal aid and introducing a language barrier. An already stressful situation has been 
exacerbated as a number of asylum seekers have been subjected to illegal treatment; sleep 
deprivation, ill-treatment and harassment to name a few
19
 (European Council on Refugees 
and Exiles, 2005). An area for concern as regards forced departure is the insecurity faced by 
returnees.  
                                                        
18
 “Detained asylum seekers are exposed to an increased array of adverse events as a result of the 
detention process itself…these include loss of liberty, uncertainty regarding return to country of 
origin, social isolation, abuse from staff, exposure to the forceful removal of detainees, riots, hunger 
strikes and self-harm” (Robjant, Robbins and Senior, 2009, p. 276). 
19
 “In 2004 the Medical Foundation examined 14 cases of alleged abuse by staff; in 12 of the cases 
gratuitous or excessive force was used” (Independent Asylum Commission, 2007, p. 12). 
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The European Council on Refugees and Exiles maintained that: 
 In 2005 two European countries, Poland and the United 
Kingdom, forcibly returned Iraqi asylum seekers whose 
applications had been rejected to Iraq... The ECRE believes that 
the current situation in Iraq is such that the mandatory or forced 
return of Iraqis is unacceptable, and recommends a continued 
ban on forced return to any part of the country (European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2006, p. 453).  
Furthermore, evidence shows that often migrants have been illegally smuggled into the host 
country. The speedy deportation of these migrants may result in individuals returning to their 
country of origin indebted to their smuggler, leaving them in a precarious and vulnerable 
situation (Koser, 2005). It is also argued that forced removal or deportation is unsustainable; 
those who return in debt have an incentive to leave the country again.  
It is clear that forced removal of migrants is neither humane nor sustainable. Forced 
repatriation is costly (National Audit Office, 2009). Involuntary return does not always 
encourage migrants to remain in their country of origin and many organisations have serious 
doubts about how enforced removal is a violation of individual‟s rights and freedoms. 
Despite these concerns, to allay public fears and for international migration systems to work 
effectively, most would agree that those whose claims are rejected and fail to leave the host 
state of their own volition must be humanely deported (Robinson, 2003, cited by Koser, 
2005, p.22).  Nevertheless, Gibney and Hansen argue that “...deportation is, from the state‟s 
point of view, both ineffectual and essential” (Gibney and Hansen, 2003, p.2). Repatriation 
“must be maintained for three reasons: to assuage public opinion, as a disincentive for other 
potential migrants and to allow pressure to be applied on voluntary return” (Koser, 2005). 
There can be no doubt that voluntary return is the preferable means of removing migrants 
from a state‟s territory. 
Assisted Voluntary Return from the UK 
Voluntary return has three primary advantages. Firstly as an important facet of the UNHCR 
durable solutions of return. Secondly, migrants have the opportunity to participate in their 
own migration matters. Thirdly, scholars argue that the voluntary return of migrants can be 
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highly positive to the country of origin; migrants may return with new skills and their return 
can assist with the physical, cultural and social reconstruction of a country or region (Black 
and Gent, 2006).  
Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARRP)
20
 in the UK has been 
funded by the European Refugee Fund and since 1999 has been assisting refugees to 
voluntarily return to their countries of origin (Webber, 2011). Applicants are required to 
leave the UK within three months of their application being approved (Webber, 2011). 
Since early 2011, Refugee Action has facilitated the Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) 
scheme on behalf of the UKBA. The involvement of Refugee Action in the AVR scheme has 
been generally well received (Parliament, 2011). Individuals contemplating participation in 
AVR are invited to an interview with Refugee Action who gives impartial and confidential 
advice to the migrant specific to their situation, and as to whether AVR is suitable. This 
recent inclusion of civil society in the AVR process assists with keeping the individual at the 
centre of the decision making process.   
Failed asylum seekers, those granted exceptional or discretional leave to remain, or those 
with an outstanding asylum claim, are all eligible to participate in AVR programmes. In 
conjunction with Refugee Action, the IOM and the UKBA, those who choose to participate in 
AVR have substantial freedom to participate in creating their reintegration package. 
Individuals may request particular arrangements for return. For example returnees from the 
UK to Pakistan were offered assistance in setting up a business upon return to Pakistan 
(Home Office, 2010). 
Advantages of a referral to Refugee Action are plural. An individual will benefit from 
specialised expertise in issues facing returnees in a particular regional and country context. 
The UKBA benefits from passing on the responsibility of ensuring the mental, physical and 
emotional security of the migrants prior to return. The constant privatisation of UKBA 
services is symptomatic of harsh government spending cuts and it is arguably not entirely 
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 The UKBA offer VARRP to “those who have sought asylum and those with certain forms of related 
temporary status in the UK. Returnees receive support in acquiring travel documentation, flight to 
country of origin and onward domestic transport, airport assistance at departure and arrival airports 
and up to £1500 worth of reintegration assistance per person including a £500 relocation grant on 
departure for immediate resettlement needs and, once home, a range of reintegration options.  The 
majority of returnees use their reintegration assistance in income generation activities.” (Parliament, 
2011). 
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erroneous. Many of the contracts awarded by the UKBA have been to charitable 
organisations. It could be argued that the welfare of individuals within the asylum process 
may be better cared for by organisations that place the individual at the centre of the issue, 
rather than passing individuals through a bureaucratic state process.  
Assisted Voluntary Return from the UK:            
A Vanguard for Return or Harbinger of Repatriation 
Despite efforts to ensure that individuals are given an opportunity to participate in their own 
return, applicants are “warned that they may be subject to a re-entry ban to the UK for up to 
five years. They have to sign an indemnity declaring that IOM is not liable for personal injury 
or death during and/or after their participation in the IOM programme” (Webber, 2010, para. 
3). Despite their substantial efforts to induce volunteers, the IOM do not guarantee the safety 
of voluntary returnees, and returnees are required to sign a declaration clearing the IOM of 
any potential wrong-doing, thus raises concern over the motivation for return. Returnees are 
often faced with a variety of obstacles to reintegration upon their return to their country of 
origin. Often, the authorities and the local community can be hostile to returnees, particularly 
if they are from ethnic minorities: “seeking asylum abroad may be seen as akin to disloyalty” 
(Webber, 2010, para. 10), inviting institutional suspicion and racism. One particular example 
is the return of Russians where:  
The Russian government has a negative attitude towards returnees 
as they believe that the returnees have damaged their image. They 
hold that those who have sought asylum in another country, have 
put the Russian Federation in a bad light…The Russian 
government takes no initiative in the reception and support of 
returnees. (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2005, p. 39).  
Moreover, there is evidence to highlight that a number of Kurdish individuals from the UK to 
Iraq were not permitted to re-enter Iraq upon arrival; authorities refused to accept these 
returnees citing that the Kurds will be at physical risk in Baghdad. Webber continues arguing 
that “it seems wholly unrealistic to expect any Kurd to volunteer for a return to such 
conditions, yet the government‟s efforts to induce Iraqi Kurds to return to central Iraq 
continue unabated.” (Webber, 2011, p. 102: Green, 2011). 
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An additional factor in the decision making process for those choosing to leave voluntarily is 
that asylum seekers had to wait excessive periods before their immigration status was 
determined. It is for this reason that a minority of migrants chose to voluntarily return home 
before receiving the UKBA‟s final decision. Furthermore having to uphold strict reporting 
requirements and not having the right to work in the UK distanced individuals from settling 
in the UK and is a barrier to integrating into society, “a minority...chose to return...before 
receiving the final decision on their asylum application. This group stated that the uncertainty 
and passivity of prolonged waiting in asylum centres was the main reason for returning” 
(CMI, 2008, p. vi).  In 2006, 74 percent of cases received a decision within six months, 
nevertheless the backlog of legacy cases still move incredibly slowly (Black & Gent, 2004).  
The UKBA programme is marketed as a justice based programme
21
, designed to allow 
immigrants the discretion to return to their country of origin during peacetime. Nevertheless 
it is argued by many that a  
major issue is that most refugees never actually return to their 
previous home, since post-conflict societies remain divided. 
Returnees, many of whom have lost essential documents during 
periods of conflict, are often subject to the same constraints as new 
arrivals and must re-establish themselves in their home country 
(Blitz, Sales & Marzano, 2005, p. 185: Webber, 2010).  
Furthermore once an applicant has been returned to their home country they are no longer 
monitored. The IOM “acknowledges that it does not monitor voluntary returnees…The 
governments which fund the voluntary return programmes do not monitor returnees' 
reintegration and success either.” (Webber, 2010, para. 9). Interestingly a study of forty-eight 
Sri Lankan returnees had some staggering results: 
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  Interestingly, Blitz, Sales & Marzano have found that there are:  
three discourses of return (Sales and Blitz, 2003): firstly justice-based 
arguments, under which returns are seen as a means of resolving conflicts 
and restoring social order. Secondly, the human capital argument is based 
on the notion that returnees bring skills that can help in reconstruction. 
Thirdly, the burden-relieving argument based on the notion that large 
numbers of refugees can cause social and political problems in the 
country of exile. We argue that, while voluntary return programmes were 
promoted using the first two of these discourses, in reality the primary 
focus of British policy has been on burden-relieving (Blitz, Sales & 
Marzano, 2005, p.183).  
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...four returnees reported that they had experienced human rights 
abuses at the hands of Sri Lankan authorities since they had 
returned home. In addition, virtually all of the Tamil returnees 
reported incidents of racial harassment, typically at the hands of Sri 
Lankan law enforcement or other government officials. A total of 
44 of the 48 returnees had opened …only four business owners 
reported that businesses generated a profit above subsistence levels 
and 20 businesses had closed completely…Four returnees had no 
security of accommodation and were dependent on nightly rented 
accommodation or other arrangements. (Development Research 
Centre on Migration, Globalization & Poverty, 2009 p. 2). 
One could also argue that the assisted voluntary return programmes offered by the IOM are 
not sustainable measures. The same study of the Sri Lanka returnees found that “A total of 45 
returnees, meanwhile, indicated that they hoped to emigrate again.” (Development Research 
Centre on Migration, Globalization & Poverty, 2009 p. 2). 
How Voluntary is Voluntary Return? 
A further contention as regards voluntary repatriation programmes is that they are not 
genuinely voluntary. Webber argues that none of the programmes offered by the UK are 
voluntary: “Voluntary return is frequently offered as a less painful alternative to continued 
destitution followed by (inevitable) compulsory return, and it is generally impossible for the 
returnee to have an informed choice about the country they are returning to.” (Webber, 2010, 
para 13). Although Refugee Action is commissioned to provide applicants with the necessary 
information to make an informed decision, the source of information comes from the UKBA 
and the IOM which is “likely to be viewed as suspect” (Webber, 2010, para. 18).  
Indeed, in a similar scheme operated by the Norwegian government to encourage migrants to 
return home, there were a number of interesting findings. It became clear that the offering of a 
return package including cash and access to training programmes was not the primary 
motivation for migrants to participate in AVR. The main cause of returning through AVR was 
to avoid forced deportation which, it was argued, did not preserve dignity. The UNHCR 
argues that: “Voluntariness of repatriation being a basic tenet of UNHCR protection mandate, 
States are urged not to resort to forced returns of refugees, which could amount to a violation 
28 
 
of the fundamental principle of non-refoulment” (UNHCR, n.d. p. 4). However, “When 
prompted none of the informants said that the cash payment or reintegration support had been 
a factor in the decision to return home” (CMI, 2008, p. 6). Furthermore, there are few 
favourable alternatives for failed asylum seekers. Refugees have the choice to remain in the 
host country legally; failed asylum seekers and illegal migrants are not afforded this luxury 
and therefore the voluntariness of these schemes is strained.  
The UNHCR has criteria which must be fulfilled for a programme to legitimately be 
„voluntary‟ one such criterion is that the choice to leave is genuine and not induced. The 
UNHCR holds that:  
One of the most important elements in the verification of 
voluntariness is the legal status of the refugees in the country of 
asylum. If refugees are legally recognized as such, their rights are 
protected and if they are allowed to settle, their choice to repatriate 
is likely to be truly free and voluntary. If, however, their rights are 
not recognized, if they are subjected to pressures and restrictions 
and confined to closed camps, they may choose to return, but this is 
not an act of free will. (UNHCR, 1996, p. 10).  
It is therefore clear that repatriation cannot be “voluntary‟ if the alternative is destitution with 
no legal status.  
the ... Home Office has consistently and for many years resorted to 
measures that force asylum seekers to agree for voluntary 
repatriation ...These include taking away legal rights and welfare 
payments or denying basic facilities (European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles, 2005, p. 39). 
Conclusion 
The methods to remove migrants from the UK are plural. This chapter has established that 
voluntary return is favourable over forced removal. Forced removal is identified as a non-
sustainable and costly method of migrant removal as well as having undignified aspects. 
Voluntary return, by contrast is found to be a more dignified, cheaper and sustainable method 
of removal. Despite the merits of voluntary return the criticisms are multiple; that many 
voluntary return schemes are not truly voluntary; merely paying individuals to return home, 
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indeed one Afghani respondent claimed “It is as if our lives are being bought for £600. If the 
situation improves, we will not need £600 to go back.” (Blitz, Sales & Marzano, 2005, cited 
in Webber, 2010, p.105).  
 
This chapter argues that the UK has forcibly removed large numbers of individuals and 
evidence from the ECRE shows that the UK is complicit in the premature repatriation of 
migrants. It is fair to state that, in order to encourage voluntary departure, individuals must be 
aware of the realities of continuing to remain in the UK and rejecting Assisted Voluntary 
Return. Forced removal acts in the UK as an incentive for migrants to participate in Assisted 
Voluntary Return. However, one might argue that the UK has adopted a particularistic 
approach and is not fulfilling its duty to protect those fleeing persecution or war, particularly 
in regions where it is partly responsible for displacement.  
It is countries that were not involved in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
such as Sweden, that are hosting Iraqi refugees. In 2006 Sweden 
received almost 9,000 asylum applications from Iraqis, and 
extended some form of protection to 90 per cent of these...By 
contrast the UK received 1,300 applications and offered protection 
to just 12 per cent. (Cooley & Rutter, 2007, p. 178).  
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the UK has been heavily criticised for many of its efforts to 
return migrants, few critics have provided a solution to the dignified removal of migrants. 
Many would describe assisted voluntary return as a “very short term and piecemeal” policy to 
remove unwanted migrants (Webber, 2010, p. 101). In many cases the EU nations have 
adopted more extreme measures to distance migrants from permanent settlement in Europe, 
denying them access to the asylum process in the first place. This paper will now examine 
one of these measures to ensure non-settlement of individuals: temporary protection.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Temporary Protection: A Paradigm for Eschewing Of State 
Responsibilities and Premature Return in Europe? 
Chapter two indicated how states, in particular the UK, have placed a great emphasis on the 
removal of migrants from their territory. A costly initiative, states have turned to proactive 
policies to avoid the costs of removal of migrants, particularly in the case of mass influx.  
Scholars argue that the numerous ad-hoc arrangements created by the European community 
to deal with mass influx of migrants have been palliative at best to protect the rights of those 
fleeing civil war (Thornburn, 1995). Thornburn (1995) argues that emergency procedures 
architected by the EU focused on return as the only goal for states, rather than the protection 
of life and liberty of individuals. The 1951 Convention has been utilised as a foundation for 
its appropriate definition of the term „refugee‟. Nevertheless, states have restricted eligibility 
in recent years; fleeing war has become, for many states, „not good enough‟ to warrant 
refugee status (Thornburn, 1995). Protection from armed conflict is not encompassed in many 
state entry policies and asylum procedures. It is for this reason that the status of temporary 
protection was created for large numbers of people fleeing armed conflict.  
During the 1990s, the EU was inundated with large numbers of asylum seekers, largely from 
Eastern Europe (Koser, Walsh and Black, 1998). This chapter aims to analyse European 
government usage of temporary protection mechanism in a bid to assess whether temporary 
protection is abused by states to protect their interests; placing premature return at the centre 
of the temporary protection paradigm. To this end, it will first be necessary to examine the 
history of temporary protection along with its past and present legal status within Europe. 
This study of temporary protection as a tool to induce forced repatriation will also benefit 
from an examination of a number of cases where individuals or groups have been granted 
temporary protection. Finally this chapter will evaluate whether the status of temporary 
protection is indeed a method to distance certain migrants from national asylum systems and 
on occasions forcibly remove migrants, or whether it is a pragmatic tool to assist with the 
large and overwhelming administrational procedures surrounding mass human displacement. 
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Temporary Protection Within The International Legal Framework Pre-2001 
In order to establish the legal status and consequence of temporary protection it is first 
necessary to contextualise temporary status as an instrument within the existing refugee 
system. The 1951 Convention on Refugees enshrines the rights and duties for refugees and 
states, it does not make reference to temporary protection; a phenomenon which emerged in 
the 1990s.  
The UNHCR has outlined three “durable solutions” within the realm of refugee protection; 
the safe repatriation of immigrants to their country of origin, the integration of refugees into 
the local community and the resettlement of immigrants in a third state (UNHCR, 2011). 
Maximising on these guidelines, states place the return of migrants at the centre of asylum 
policies, nevertheless, the 1951 Refugee Convention prohibits the forced repatriation of 
refugees (UN General Assembly, 1951, Art. 33).  Therefore, the principle of non-refoulment 
as established in article 33 of the 1951 Convention is something of a barrier to states wishing 
to remove its migrant populations. Conversely the nature of temporary protection permits 
states to return its temporary protection populations to their countries of origin as soon as 
conflict has ended (Koser, Walsh and Black, 1998).  
The issue of temporary protection is pertinent especially within Europe as an emerging body 
of law. However the Refugee Convention is silent on the issue of temporary protection (UN 
General Assembly, 1951). More worrying still, it is argued that there is even less research on 
the return of peoples under its status (Koser, Walsh and Black, 1998).  
Understanding Temporary Protection 
The European Council on Refugees and Exiles defines temporary protection as: 
Temporary protection is a procedure of an exceptional character 
during an emergency situation that involves a mass influx of 
displaced persons. Individual refugee status determination is not 
immediately practicable in such a situation, because of the time and 
evidence required to do a full and fair evaluation of protection 
needs. (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, n.d.a). 
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Temporary protection refers to the status given to asylum seekers during times of great 
instability, to safeguard potential host states from being overwhelmed by mass movement
22
 
(Koser, Walsh and Black, 1998). Temporary protection affords governments with more 
leniencies as regards asylum procedures; states may circumvent or suspend their usual 
practices (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, n.d.a). Those permitted to remain in the 
host country are also granted fewer rights (Koser, Walsh and Black, 1998). The most 
poignant difference between those granted temporary protection and those granted leave to 
remain is that temporary status is just as the title suggests – temporary. Fitzpatrick argues that 
the granting of temporary protection was under a perception of “grace rather than a legal 
obligation” (2000, p. 284).  
Scholars contend that temporary protection conflicts directly with many provisions of the 
1951 Refugee Convention (Akram & Rempel, 2004). Firstly it is argued that the duration of 
temporary protection status is not determined on the severity of the situation in the country of 
origin, rather it is determined on the desirable period of protection a state is willing to 
provide. This “contrasts markedly with non-refoulment under the 1951 Convention, which 
must be non-discriminatory on nationality grounds and is tied to the persistence of danger 
rather than artificial time constraints” (Fitzpatrick, 2000, p. 285). Indeed Fitzpatrick also 
argues that temporary protection has been used as a method to dilute protection for those 
eligible for refugee status under the 1951 Convention (Fitzpatrick, 2000). Dennis 
MacNamara, Director for International Protection at the UNHCR agrees, that in some states 
“large numbers of people, including genuine refugees, are left to languish in a kind of legal 
limbo, traumatised and separated from their families, while conflicts drag on for months or 
years” (MacNamara & Goodwin-Gill, 1999, p. 7). 
Finally, there is agreement that the regional homogenisation of the temporary protection 
procedures is incompatible with the aims and purposes of the Refugee Convention. This 
conflict can be best explained in the example below. During the late 1980s amidst the sabre-
rattling between the East and West, European states favoured, and gave preference
23
 to 
refugees from former communist states. This dealt “an ideological blow to the communist 
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 “With over half a million people seeking asylum in the early 1990s in western Europe, there was 
concern both from governments and UNHCR that the system of granting asylum could be 
overwhelmed by the number of claims.” (Koser, Walsh & Black, 1998). 
23
 This favouritism is termed presumptive refugee status; that migrants from certain countries are 
presumed refugees without substantive determination; this could be described as a universalist 
approach to protection. 
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countries by stigmatising them as persecutors, while simultaneously promoting western 
liberal values” (Collinson, 1993, p. 66). However, following the fall of Communism in the 
East, Europe closed its borders to Eastern European migrants, finding that there was little to 
gain from the „trophy refugee‟ (Fitzpatrick, 1995). It is clear from this example that regional 
systems of asylum and temporary protection providence can be influenced by political 
opinions of the origin state. Article three of the Refugee Convention explicitly prohibits the 
discriminiation of individuals to refugee status on the basis of nationality (UN General 
Assembly, 1951, Art. 3). Nonetheless it is evident that there exists favouritism during certain 
periods of history, towards specific groups of refugees being granted asylum or temporary 
protection status. 
Indeed, the nature of temporary protection and its politicisation provides that states must 
discriminate that all individuals from a certain country will automatically be provided with 
temporary protection, conversely, individuals from a different country of origin may not be 
fortunate to receive the same protection (MacNamara & Goodwin-Gill, 1999). The UNHCR 
attempts to placate this blatent abuse of the Refugee Convention, stating that:  
Too often, efforts to stop large flows of illegal migrants also deny 
asylum-seekers access to protection mechanisms...States have a 
sovereign right to protect their borders; but they also have a 
responsibility to deal fairly with the related problems of asylum and 
immigration. (MacNamara & Goodwin-Gill, 1999, p. 8). 
The importance given to political stability and state sovereignty by the UNHCR clearly 
undermines the international obligations of member states to the Refugee Convention. This 
chapter investigates and attempts to analyse how the European system has attempted to 
balance state sovereignty with equitable protection within the existing legal framework.  
The European Directive on Temporary Protection  
In 2001 the European Community established the minimum standards for member states in 
providing temporary protection in the event of mass influx of displaced persons (European 
Union, 2001, Art. 20) (hereafter the European Directive). These minimum standards came in 
the form of a European Council Directive; an instrument which sets out the objectives of the 
community in a particular area (Refugee Council, 2011). Unlike regulations, directives are 
not automatically incorporated into domestic law, and member states are given the autonomy 
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to implement the principles of the directive as best fits their state; member states do not have 
to amend existing laws and policies unless they are in direct conflict with the principles of the 
directive. Under the auspices of creating a homogenous asylum system within Europe, the 
2001 EC Directive came after a number of proposals submitted by the Commission
24
 (Kerber, 
2002). This particular document gives great emphasis on the principle of burden sharing in 
Europe, referring often to the preparation of a common policy on asylum, indeed article 20 
states: 
Provision should be made for a solidarity mechanism intended to 
contribute to the attainment of a balance of effort between Member 
States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving 
displaced persons in the event of a mass influx. The mechanism 
should consist of two components. The first is financial and the 
second concerns the actual reception of persons in the Member 
States (European Union, 2001, art. 20).  
The directive has been praised for its commitment to creating a unified system of temporary 
protection. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles welcomes the directive‟s attempt 
to introduce an upper limit to the period of temporary protection. Article four prohibits the 
granting of temporary protection for a period longer than one year (European Union, 2001, 
art. 4). It is important to note that the introduction of an upper limit to the duration of 
temporary protection means that states may not grant temporary protection status where they 
are aware that the individual will not be able to return to their country of origin within one 
year. In many European states, temporary protection and the asylum system are mutually 
exclusive and individuals may not apply for asylum whilst in receipt of temporary protection; 
creating a disincentive for the individual to apply for asylum (UKBA, n.d.b, Art. 335G). Thus 
creating a conundrum where if an individual gambles on applying for asylum they also 
sacrifice their right to temporary protection; alternatively individuals may be barred by the 
state from applying for asylum whilst in receipt of temporary protection.  
                                                        
24
 This was the third time that this proposal was submitted, however this proposal was successfully 
adopted as a result of “the European Union‟s new competence in the field of asylum under the EC 
Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam” (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2001, 
p.1). 
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Prior to the directive, states have been extending the period of temporary protection in a bid 
to distance the individual from the asylum system. Given that a major function of temporary 
protection is to assist member states with the administration of a mass influx of migrants it 
seems appropriate that, “once immediate temporary protection has been provided, the normal 
status determination procedure should begin to deal steadily with applications as soon as 
possible” (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2001, p.10) and that the potential 
expulsion of individuals in receipt of temporary protection from the domestic asylum process 
is “both logically and administratively incoherent.” (European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles, 2001, p.11) .  
It is clear that the 2001 directive aimed to create a unified system within Europe in 
administering a mass influx of migrants, indeed the directive must be applauded for its 
commitment to the voluntary return of individuals with temporary protection status. Article 
21 states that: 
“The Member State shall ensure that the decision of those persons 
to return is taken in full knowledge of the facts. The Member States 
may provide for exploratory visits.” (European Union, 2001, art. 
21). 
Whilst the ECRE is supportive of many of the provisions within the directive it notes a 
number of concerns with the document. Primarily the largest area of contention is that the 
directive does not contain a provision on procedures. States are required to implement policies 
in line with the directive, however the directive does not offer regulations as to how member 
states should do this. It is clear that the directive had a difficult birth, and therefore through its 
continual politicisation, the strength of the directive has been diluted. 
The weakness of the European community to follow through the provisions of the Council‟s 
directive is made clearer by the fact that both Ireland and Denmark have opted out of the 
directive to secure minimum standards for those in receipt of temporary protection (Cooley & 
Rutter, 2007). The futile implementation of this directive, and wider temporary protection 
issues, is particularly salient in the case of the UK as addressed below. 
Eschewing of State Responsibilities or a Pragmatic Tool?  
It can be seen through the case of Bosnian migrants that the usual procedure as regards 
asylum applications is altered in the case of temporary protection. Based on the fact that they 
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have a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds nationality, ethnicity and religion, 
Kjaerum argues that the majority of migrants from Bosnia-Herzogovina in western Europe 
would have been granted refugee status if processed under traditional methods (Kjaerum, 
1994). Nevertheless, European states ability to grant temporary protection status was 
determined by the sheer volume of people moving into western European territories. That is 
not to say that states are legally or even morally incorrect for granting temporary protection 
over refugee status in emergency situations. The very benefit of temporary protection, for 
both sides, is that migrants can safely return to their country of origin as soon as it is safe to 
do so.  
The majority of migrants do not want to remain in their host country indefinitely. The 
questions of contention are three fold; where individuals or groups are granted temporary 
protection over refugee status in a non-emergency context, where individuals or groups are 
not safely repatriated and where domestic policy give those in receipt of temporary protection 
restricted rights compared to those with refugee status. Prior to the 2001 directive, Spain and 
Hungary granted their temporarily protected populations full rights to work and family 
reunification (Kjaerum, 1994). Conversely Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany 
differentiated the restrictions on the right to work and access to primary education from other 
foreign nationals (Kjaerum, 1994).  
Moreover, until 2005, the UK granted “exceptional leave to remain” to its temporarily 
protected populations. Those granted exceptional leave to remain were only permitted to 
apply for family reunification after four years (Kjaerum, 1994). Article seventeen of the 
ICCPR and article eight of the ECHR denote that individuals have a right to private and 
family life. Article sixteen of the UDHR expresses that “the family is a natural and 
fundamental unit of society”. Case law from the ECtHR highlights that placing barriers to 
family reunification is a violation of article eight, the right to private and family life. Kjaerum 
concludes that “unless it is certain that the person will be able to return home within a very 
limited time, for example, 6-12 months, family reunification should be granted with no 
delay.” (Kjaerum, 1994, p.452). 
Further to the right to private and family life, prior to the 2001 directive, in countries such as 
Germany and the Netherlands those in receipt of temporary protection status were, like 
asylum seekers, not granted work permits (Kjaerum, 1994). Whilst this may seem like 
equitable treatment for all foreigners it must be noted that upon receipt of temporary 
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protection, individual asylum claims are “frozen” meaning that these individuals had no 
prospect of working for the duration of their stay in the host country. This is not an 
inconsequential point, the right to work can be crucial to the preservation of human dignity
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(Murphy and Athanason, 1999:Mind, 2009b); the opportunity to work facilitates the 
integration of migrants into their new communities, if only for a short period. Allowing 
migrants the right to work can ease social tensions, particularly in areas where they are 
viewed as a burden. It is of course important to take into account the there may be severe 
ramifications for the labour market from a sudden influx of temporarily protected persons. 
Nevertheless, this should not be the basis upon which governments forbid the right to work 
for migrants who have no control over their own immigration status, and who may have to 
wait months or even years before they can return home or file a claim for asylum. It may be 
agreeable for governments to issue limits and restrictions to individuals‟ right to work during 
times of political or economic instability; this, however, does not condone a blanket ban on 
the right to work of individuals.  
Furthermore it would appear from the above that prior to 2001 some European governments 
attempted to distance migrants from basic social needs. Without the reunification of family 
members or employment, migrants may not feel secure and content in their host country. It 
could be argued that the disassociation of temporarily protected peoples from a dignified 
existence may make it easier for governments to initiate removal procedures. It is preferable, 
and indeed considerably cheaper, to repatriate an individual on a voluntary basis and without 
the fulfilment of basic needs, partially because migrants are more willing to return. It is 
therefore clear that the harshening of asylum procedures and the non-fulfilment of basic 
rights is utilised as a means to encourage the voluntary return of certain migrants prior to the 
2001 directive.  
Temporary Protection, its Directive and the UK 
Temporary protection within the UK has been a problematic entity. Following an EU-wide 
governmental questionnaire posed by Denmark in 1998, it became apparent that prior to the 
introduction of the European Directive, the UK among others, did not have a legal definition 
for temporary or subsidiary protection. The UK preferred instead to implement ad-hoc 
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 “We often look to our job for a sense of identity and…If work provides a sense of achievement, 
pride in expertise and an assured social position in the workplace…unemployment can take this 
away.” (Mind, 2009b, p.19) 
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mechanisms to compliment the Refugee Convention (McAdam, 2005). Secretary of State for 
Immigration, Damien Green affirmed this stance in May 2011 stating that “We remain 
strongly of the view that the criteria for invocation of the Temporary Protection Directive are 
a long way from being met; and that relocating migrants within the EU simply creates 
incentives for increased illegal immigration.” (Green, 2011, para. 60). 
The European Council has attempted to unify policy on temporary protection; nevertheless 
the minimal and non-pragmatic quality of the 2001 directive has not been successful in 
enforcing a unilateral system of temporary protection provision. The fact that the UK did not 
adopt many of the 2001 directive provisions until 2005 is evidence that the European 
community as a whole have been lax in their implementation of this legally binding 
instrument. As with so many other issues in the regional and international fora, political 
concerns and inter-state benevolence have been allowed to reign supreme over the protection 
of individuals. McAdam argues that  
The Directive should not be viewed as an example of 
complementary protection for universal adoption. Much of its 
content has been determined by regional conditions and concerns, 
and its scope is far narrower than protection principles under 
international human rights law, humanitarian law and international 
criminal law provide. (McAdam, 2007, p.516).  
In this respect European States have established a new status of „temporary protection‟ to 
allow themselves the right to forcibly remove migrants; in granting a victim of conflict 
temporary protection over refugee status the State has protected itself from the principle of 
non-refoulment. 
Conclusion  
It is clear that the European Council has attempted to unify policy on temporary protection, 
nevertheless the minimal and non-pragmatic quality of the 2001 directive teamed with a 
particularistic attitude to protection, has resulted in unsuccessful enforcement of a unilateral 
system of temporary protection provision. “Increasingly, victims of conflict are forced to 
become irregular migrants, as asylum overstayers or those who overstay forms of temporary 
protection” (Cooley and Rutter, 2007, p. 176). Moreover, the fact that the UK did not adopt 
many of the 2001 directive provisions until 2005 is evidence that, as with so many other 
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issues in regional and international cooperation, political concerns and international peace 
have been placed at the fore; Fitzpatick highlights this point, stating: 
Many states with developed systems for refugee determination and 
substantial absorptive capacity now channel certain asylum-seekers 
into schemes for temporary protection, with the avowed aim for 
facilitating their eventual repatriation by preventing them from 
developing the links that transform refugees into permanent 
immigrants. The circumstance of arriving as part of a mass influx, 
rather that the cause of flight now frequently determines whether 
asylum or temporary protection will be offered. (Fitzpatrick, 1995, 
p. 16). 
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CONCLUSION 
The number of asylum applications lodged and processed in the EU has been on a steady 
decrease since 2003 (Cooley and Rutter, 2007), yet violent conflict, persecution and the 
denial of basic human rights by states continues unabated. It is problematic to justify the 
particularistic attempts of the EU to prematurely remove individuals from its territory. 
Especially when compared with the monumental efforts by resource poor countries to 
receive, process and host individuals fleeing their countries. As one of the richest continents 
on the planet (Forbes, 2009) the international community looks to the EU to share the burden 
of those displaced by war and persecution, nevertheless this paper has demonstrated that 
burden sharing is high on the agenda within the EU but not outside.  
Many of the EU 27 were involved with the drafting of the United Nations Refugee 
Convention in 1951. Their involvement in defining rights for refugees at this time is 
symptomatic of a post-war camaraderie. The European contingent of the UN explicitly called 
for a strong document to outline international responsibility in the reception and hosting of 
those fleeing war and persecution (Guild, 2006). The desire to protect and respect the rights 
of displaced individuals was underpinned by the political will of governments to assist 
victims of communist repression and persecution (Ogata, 1992). Nevertheless it is clear from 
the evidence provided by this dissertation that this commitment to the right to flee one‟s 
country has become weakened in favour of territorial sovereignty in recent decades.  
As one of the three durable solutions proposed by the UNHCR as regards immigration and 
asylum, return has been placed at the forefront of policy making world-wide. The then UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs Ogata, predicted that from 1992 there would be a 
“decade of repatriation” (Ogata, 1992, para. 16). The EU is by no means an exception to this. 
The theory of returns highlights the controversy in prematurely returning individuals to 
broken communities. The argument that returnees can assist in the rebuilding of communities 
is juxtaposed with the fact that returnees often face extreme personal instability upon return. 
Despite this fact, repatriation of individuals to unstable regions remains the norm, as is 
displayed in the case of Kurdish returnees to Iraq. 
The first chapter of this paper outlined the legal and theoretical framework of the receipt, 
protection and return of asylum seekers and refugees. It was found that the EU, bore 
exclusionist policies until the 1990s. The Amsterdam and Maastricht treaties made no 
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mention of the freedom of movement for refugees within EU territory. Exclusionism teamed 
with the restrictions of the Schengen Agreement and Dublin Convention of the 1990s has 
afforded irregular migrants in the EU with limited rights and opportunity to access asylum 
systems.  
Chapter one demonstrated how the EU has interpreted the Geneva Convention to protect its 
territory from individuals seeking asylum, arguing that it is the obligation of individuals to 
claim asylum in the first safe country
26
 they reach, regardless of the fact that they may have 
family relations or other ties to an EU member state. The Hague Programme of 2004 is also 
critiqued for the risk that it poses to infringement of the Geneva Convention with lists of safe 
countries of origin and its lack of support for neighbouring countries. Furthermore, chapter 
one examined burden-sharing as an EU initiative, with a particular focus on the most 
successful area: financial burden sharing. The European Return Fund is found to be an 
appropriate mechanism to assist EU member states in coping with the burden of irregular 
migrants. Nevertheless it could be argued that the use of the Fund to finance premature return 
of migrants is contentious. The de facto and de jure premature removal of migrants to their 
countries of origin should be financed solely by the host state, not the regional community, 
particularly taking into account the mutual recognition provisions of the Tampere 
Conclusions of 1999 which state that:  
The European Council therefore endorses the principle of mutual 
recognition...Such decisions would be automatically recognised 
throughout the Union without any intermediate proceedings or 
grounds for refusal of enforcement. (European Union, 1999, Arts. 
32 & 33). 
These provisions signify that the use of community funds for premature return without access 
to community judicial review are problematic at best and that member states sovereignty is at 
the apex of European priorities. Indeed the sovereignty of member states to repatriate of their 
own choosing and with the assistance of community funds is demonstrated in the case of the 
UK.  
                                                        
26 Simple geographical conditions often means that EU states are protected from the arrival of an 
immigrant without passing through a safe third country. 
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The case study on the UK highlights the failings of assisted voluntary return. Marketed as a 
long term and cost effective solution to the UK‟s asylum „problem‟, assisted voluntary return 
it is deemed, is not sustainable, entirely humane or indeed voluntary. The sustainability of 
voluntary return is doubtful when it is considered that migrants are not monitored upon their 
return. The evidence showing that returnees face further persecution upon return is a 
worrying trend in itself. Non-monitoring of migrants does not allow for clear policy 
recommendations to be made; how can a government decide that a country of origin remains 
safe for returnees if it does not monitor the progress of previous participants? How is the 
dignity of returnees entirely preserved if individuals believe that their lives are being bought, 
as indicated by one Afghani respondent (see page 31)? Furthermore, it is unknown by host 
governments whether migrants emigrate again and evidence shows that many returnees 
through the assisted return schemes hope to do so. It is also unclear whether voluntary return 
can be voluntary when the alternative is certain destitution with no legal status. 
The third chapter demonstrated the urge of the European community to distance migrants 
from asylum systems and basic rights guaranteed to regular asylum seekers. Mass exodus 
from the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s triggered an ad-hoc response the large number 
of asylum seekers arriving in EU territory. The granting of temporary protection, it is argued, 
is purposeful in that it allows governments and their relevant agencies to handle asylum 
claims in an efficient and systematic manner, dedicating appropriate time and resources to 
each claim without the time constraints associated with large scale influx.  
Nevertheless, it is doubted as to what extent temporary protection is legitimately granted, and 
indeed how temporary protection in Europe manifests, as a mechanism to ensure the 
premature departure of individuals. It may be fair to state that many whom have been granted 
temporary protection, would also be granted refugee status as per the definition of the 1951 
convention.  Furthermore evidence shows that temporary protection has been used within 
Europe to deny rights such as work and family reunification to individuals, as well as delay 
the application for asylum. Despite the fact that the EU has attempted to reconcile this issues 
with the introduction of a Directive on Temporary Protection, evidence shows that states have 
been slow in implementing the principles and that the welfare and rights of individuals were 
not the primary concern of the drafters; the importance of state sovereignty, political stability 
and camaraderie between member states has reigned supreme in this instance.  
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A clear theme throughout this dissertation and indeed throughout international law in a wider 
sense, is the careful balancing of state sovereignty with the rights of individuals. In the case 
of returns in Europe it is evident that territorial and political sovereignty is the heavier weight 
on the scales. The numerous directives issued by the Council provide that the EU wishes to 
protect the rights of individuals seeking asylum to the extent that their territorial sovereignty 
is not compromised. In short, national governments cannot be trusted to have just and fair 
policies regarding return and temporary protection; the formulation of such policies would 
involve nation states abnegating some of their sovereignty in this issue and adopting a 
universalistic application of protection.  
The 1950s saw a regional organization committed to the protection and hosting of those in 
need, nevertheless as conflict distances further from its territory, so does the commitment 
from the EU to receive and protect. Thus the return of individuals becomes paramount to host 
countries as a primary response to „burdensome‟ migrants. Indeed, the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles maintain that “while some measures within [European] instruments 
clearly aimed at improving standards, many others unfortunately allowed the lowest possible 
standards to prevail.” (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, n.d.b., para. 4) 
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